Author :
Abstract
Bu çalışmanın konusu, nükleer enerjinin uluslararası caydırıcılıktaki rolünün Hindistan ve Pakistan arasındaki Keşmir bölgesi sorunu kapsamında incelenmesidir. Gelişmiş ve gelişmekte olan devletlerin politikalarında ve söylemlerinde sıklıkla yer alan nükleer güç kavramının bölgesel ve küresel savaşların engellemesinde ne derece bir rol oynadığı, çalışmanın ana problemini oluşturmaktadır. Çalışma, nükleer caydırıcılık teorisinin geçerliliğini sorgulama amacı taşımaktadır. Ağırlıklı olarak literatür taraması yönteminin kullanıldığı çalışma, duygu analizi (Sentiment Analysis) yöntemiyle ayrıca desteklenmiştir. Sonuç olarak Keşmir bölgesi kapsamında yapılan analizler doğrultusunda, nükleer silah gücünün Hindistan ve Pakistan özelinde uluslararası caydırıcılıkta aktif bir rolü olduğu tespit edilmiştir.
Keywords
Abstract
The subject of this study is to examine the role of nuclear energy in international deterrence within the context of the Kashmir region problem between India and Pakistan. The main problem of the study is to what extent the concept of nuclear power, which is frequently included in the policies and discourses of developed and developing states, plays a role in preventing regional and global wars. The study aims to question the validity of the nuclear deterrence theory. The study, in which the literature review method was used, was also supported by the Sentiment Analysis method. As a result, in line with the analyzes made within the scope of the Kashmir region, it has been determined that the nuclear weapon power has an active role in international deterrence in India and Pakistan.
Keywords
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